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                            CERT-Renater

                Note d'Information No. 2026/VULN1044
_____________________________________________________________________

DATE                : 19/10/2026

HARDWARE PLATFORM(S): /

OPERATING SYSTEM(S): Systems running podman (Go) versions prior to
                                         5.8.8,
                           podman/v6 (Go) versions prior to 6.1.3.

====================================================================
https://github.com/podman-container-tools/podman/security/advisories/GHSA-2cvf-wqm6-wr9g
_____________________________________________________________________

The `podman run` command can be instructed to disable almost all
sandboxing - including user-requested sandboxing - by image
annotation

Critical
mheon published GHSA-2cvf-wqm6-wr9g

Package
github.com/containers/podman (Go)

Affected versions
>= v4.4.0

Patched versions
v5.8.8

go.podman.io/podman/v6 (Go)
Affected versions
>= v4.4.0
Patched versions
v6.1.3


Description

Impact

Podman v4.4.0 added a feature where container checkpoints (from the
podman container checkpoint command) could be distributed via OCI
registry, and pulled from that registry and run via the podman run
command. This allowed easy transfer of checkpoints between systems.
However, checkpoints allow complete control of how the container is
created - including full control of the container sandbox. When
podman run detects a checkpoint, it will silently ignore all user
input regarding how the container should be created - for example,
podman run --cap-drop=ALL on an image that is determined to be a
checkpoint will ignore --cap-drop=all and use the set of capabilities
specified by the checkpoint image instead, which could include all
capabilities. Podman identifies checkpoint images by looking for an
annotation, io.podman.annotations.checkpoint.runtime.name. If this
annotation is set, the image is treated as a checkpoint. Conflating
container images and checkpoints in podman run allows inherently
insecure behavior as the image can now control how it is executed.
The Podman Maintainers have determined that the safest course of
action is to remove this functionality.


Patch

The commit introducing this functionality was reverted.

3721ff8 c74b1d3 fa6cef2 (main)
ea9243e 450c644 2d05a7c (v6.1)
7728ba0 2470629 29c8c6e (v5.8)


Workarounds

Images being pulled should be scanned for the
io.podman.annotations.checkpoint.runtime.name annotation, and
rejected if it is present. Podman does not presently have the
ability to perform this scanning and rejection automatically.

Also not that rootless containers are not affected as they do not
support checkpoint/restore at all currently.


Credits

This vulnerability was discovered by ADA Logics Ltd using
Anthropic's Claude models.


Severity
Critical
10.0/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

CVE ID
CVE-2026-94603

Weaknesses
No CWEs


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