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                            CERT-Renater

                Note d'Information No. 2025/VULN675
_____________________________________________________________________

DATE                : 08/10/2025

HARDWARE PLATFORM(S): /

OPERATING SYSTEM(S): Systems running Rack versions prior to
                          2.2.19, 3.1.17, 3.2.2.

=====================================================================
https://github.com/rack/rack/security/advisories/GHSA-625h-95r8-8xpm
https://github.com/rack/rack/security/advisories/GHSA-p543-xpfm-54cp
https://github.com/rack/rack/security/advisories/GHSA-w9pc-fmgc-vxvw
https://github.com/rack/rack/security/advisories/GHSA-wpv5-97wm-hp9c
_____________________________________________________________________


Unsafe default in `Rack::QueryParser` allows params_limit bypass via
semicolon-separated parameters.
High
ioquatix published GHSA-625h-95r8-8xpm Sep 25, 2025

Package
rack (RubyGems)

Affected versions
< 2.2.18

Patched versions
2.2.18

Description

Summary

Rack::QueryParser in version < 2.2.18 enforces its params_limit only
for parameters separated by &, while still splitting on both & and ;.
As a result, attackers could use ; separators to bypass the parameter
count limit and submit more parameters than intended.


Details

The issue arises because Rack::QueryParser#check_query_string counts
only & characters when determining the number of parameters, but the
default separator regex DEFAULT_SEP = /[&;] */n splits on both & and ;.
This mismatch means that queries using ; separators were not included
in the parameter count, allowing params_limit to be bypassed.

Other safeguards (bytesize_limit and key_space_limit) still applied,
but did not prevent this particular bypass.


Impact

Applications or middleware that directly invoke Rack::QueryParser with
its default configuration (no explicit delimiter) could be exposed to
increased CPU and memory consumption. This can be abused as a limited
denial-of-service vector.

Rack::Request, the primary entry point for typical Rack applications,
uses QueryParser in a safe way and does not appear vulnerable by
default. As such, the severity is considered low, with the impact
limited to edge cases where QueryParser is used directly.


Mitigation

    Upgrade to a patched version of Rack where both & and ; are counted
consistently toward params_limit.
    If upgrading is not immediately possible, configure QueryParser
with an explicit delimiter (e.g., &) to avoid the mismatch.

    As a general precaution, enforce query string and request size
limits at the web server or proxy layer (e.g., Nginx, Apache, or a CDN)
to mitigate excessive parsing overhead.


Severity
High
7.5/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

CVE ID
CVE-2025-59830

Weaknesses
Weakness CWE-400
Weakness CWE-770


Credits

    @kwkr kwkr Reporter
    @jeremyevans jeremyevans Remediation developer
    @ioquatix ioquatix Remediation reviewer

_____________________________________________________________________


Unbounded multipart preamble buffering enables DoS (memory exhaustion)
High
ioquatix published GHSA-p543-xpfm-54cp Oct 7, 2025

Package
rack (RubyGems)

Affected versions
< 2.2.19
>= 3.1, < 3.1.17
>= 3.2, < 3.2.2

Patched versions
2.2.19
3.1.17
3.2.2


Description

Summary

Rack::Multipart::Parser buffers the entire multipart preamble (bytes
before the first boundary) in memory without any size limit. A client
can send a large preamble followed by a valid boundary, causing
significant memory use and potential process termination due to
out-of-memory (OOM) conditions.


Details

While searching for the first boundary, the parser appends incoming
data into a shared buffer (@sbuf.concat(content)) and scans for the
boundary pattern:

@sbuf.scan_until(@body_regex)

If the boundary is not yet found, the parser continues buffering data
indefinitely. There is no trimming or size cap on the preamble,
allowing attackers to send arbitrary amounts of data before the
first boundary.


Impact

Remote attackers can trigger large transient memory spikes by including
a long preamble in multipart/form-data requests. The impact scales with
allowed request sizes and concurrency, potentially causing worker
crashes or severe slowdown due to garbage collection.


Mitigation

    Upgrade: Use a patched version of Rack that enforces a preamble size
limit (e.g., 16 KiB) or discards preamble data entirely per
[RFC 2046 § 5.1.1](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2046.html#section-5.1.1).


    Workarounds:
        Limit total request body size at the proxy or web server level.
        Monitor memory and set per-process limits to prevent OOM
          conditions.


Severity
High
7.5/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

CVE ID
CVE-2025-61770

Weaknesses
Weakness CWE-400


Credits

    @kwkr kwkr Reporter
    @ioquatix ioquatix Remediation reviewer
    @jeremyevans jeremyevans Remediation developer

_____________________________________________________________________


Multipart parser buffers large non‑file fields entirely in memory,
enabling DoS (memory exhaustion)
High
ioquatix published GHSA-w9pc-fmgc-vxvw Oct 7, 2025

Package
rack (RubyGems)

Affected versions
< 2.2.19
>= 3.1, < 3.1.17
>= 3.2, < 3.2.2

Patched versions
2.2.19
3.1.17
3.2.2


Description

Summary

Rack::Multipart::Parser stores non-file form fields (parts without a
filename) entirely in memory as Ruby String objects. A single large text
field in a multipart/form-data request (hundreds of megabytes or more)
can consume equivalent process memory, potentially leading to
out-of-memory (OOM) conditions and denial of service (DoS).


Details

During multipart parsing, file parts are streamed to temporary files, but
non-file parts are buffered into memory:

body = String.new  # non-file → in-RAM buffer
@mime_parts[mime_index].body << content

There is no size limit on these in-memory buffers. As a result, any large
text field—while technically valid—will be loaded fully into process
memory before being added to params.


Impact

Attackers can send large non-file fields to trigger excessive memory usage.
Impact scales with request size and concurrency, potentially leading to
worker crashes or severe garbage-collection overhead.

All Rack applications processing multipart form submissions are affected.


Mitigation

    Upgrade: Use a patched version of Rack that enforces a reasonable
size cap for non-file fields (e.g., 2 MiB).

    Workarounds:
        Restrict maximum request body size at the web-server or proxy
layer (e.g., Nginx client_max_body_size).
        Validate and reject unusually large form fields at the
application level.


Severity
High
7.5/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
CVE ID
CVE-2025-61771
Weaknesses
Weakness CWE-400
Credits

    @kwkr kwkr Reporter
    @jeremyevans jeremyevans Remediation developer
    @ioquatix ioquatix Remediation reviewer


_____________________________________________________________________


Multipart parser buffers unbounded per-part headers, enabling DoS
(memory exhaustion)
High
ioquatix published GHSA-wpv5-97wm-hp9c Oct 7, 2025

Package
rack (RubyGems)

Affected versions
< 2.2.19
>= 3.1, < 3.1.17
>= 3.2, < 3.2.2

Patched versions
2.2.19
3.1.17
3.2.2


Description

Summary

Rack::Multipart::Parser can accumulate unbounded data when a multipart
part’s header block never terminates with the required blank line
(CRLFCRLF). The parser keeps appending incoming bytes to memory without
a size cap, allowing a remote attacker to exhaust memory and cause a
denial of service (DoS).


Details

While reading multipart headers, the parser waits for CRLFCRLF using:

@sbuf.scan_until(/(.*?\r\n)\r\n/m)

If the terminator never appears, it continues appending
data (@sbuf.concat(content)) indefinitely. There is no limit on
accumulated header bytes, so a single malformed part can consume
memory proportional to the request body size.


Impact

Attackers can send incomplete multipart headers to trigger high memory
use, leading to process termination (OOM) or severe slowdown. The
effect scales with request size limits and concurrency. All applications
handling multipart uploads may be affected.


Mitigation

    Upgrade to a patched Rack version that caps per-part header size
(e.g., 64 KiB).
    Until then, restrict maximum request sizes at the proxy or web
server layer (e.g., Nginx client_max_body_size).

Severity
High
7.5/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

CVE ID
CVE-2025-61772

Weaknesses
Weakness CWE-400


Credits

    @kwkr kwkr Reporter
    @jeremyevans jeremyevans Remediation developer
    @ioquatix ioquatix Remediation reviewer


=========================================================
+ CERT-RENATER        |    tel : 01-53-94-20-44         +
+ 23/25 Rue Daviel    |    fax : 01-53-94-20-41         +
+ 75013 Paris         |   email:cert@support.renater.fr +
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