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                               CERT-Renater

                    Note d'Information No. 2024/VULN558
_____________________________________________________________________

DATE                : 24/12/2024

HARDWARE PLATFORM(S): /

OPERATING SYSTEM(S): Systems running Apache MINA versions prior to
                                 2.0.27, 2.1.10, 2.2.4.

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https://lists.apache.org/thread/xd4m6zn11b70oxolc8djgdk5nw7802jb
_____________________________________________________________________

CVE-2024-52046: Apache MINA: MINA applications using unbounded
deserialization may allow RCE
Affected versions:

- Apache MINA 2.0 through 2.0.26 unknown
- Apache MINA 2.1 through 2.1.9
- Apache MINA 2.2 through 2.2.3

Description:

The ObjectSerializationDecoder in Apache MINA uses Java’s native
deserialization protocol to process incoming serialized data but
lacks the necessary security checks and defenses. This vulnerability
allows attackers to exploit the deserialization process by sending
specially crafted malicious serialized data, potentially leading to
remote code execution (RCE) attacks.



This issue affects MINA core versions 2.0.X, 2.1.X and 2.2.X, and will
be fixed by the releases 2.0.27, 2.1.10 and 2.2.4.



It's also important to note that an application using MINA core library
will only be affected if the IoBuffer#getObject() method is called, and
this specific method is potentially called when adding a
ProtocolCodecFilter instance using the ObjectSerializationCodecFactory
class in the filter chain. If your application is specifically using
those classes, you have to upgrade to the latest version of MINA core
library.


Upgrading will  not be enough: you also need to explicitly allow the
classes the decoder will accept in the ObjectSerializationDecoder
instance, using one of the three new methods:


    /**

     * Accept class names where the supplied ClassNameMatcher matches
for

     * deserialization, unless they are otherwise rejected.

     *

     * @param classNameMatcher the matcher to use

     */

    public void accept(ClassNameMatcher classNameMatcher)




    /**

     * Accept class names that match the supplied pattern for

     * deserialization, unless they are otherwise rejected.

     *

     * @param pattern standard Java regexp

     */

    public void accept(Pattern pattern) 





    /**

     * Accept the wildcard specified classes for deserialization,

     * unless they are otherwise rejected.

     *

     * @param patterns Wildcard file name patterns as defined by

     *                  {@link org.apache.commons.io.FilenameUtils#wildcardMatch(String, String) FilenameUtils.wildcardMatch}

     */

    public void accept(String... patterns)



By default, the decoder will reject *all* classes that will be
present in the incoming data.



Note: The FtpServer, SSHd and Vysper sub-project are not affected
by this issue.

References:

https://mina.apache.org/
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-52046

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