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                               CERT-Renater

                     Note d'Information No. 2021/VULN081
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DATE                : 17/02/2022

HARDWARE PLATFORM(S): /

OPERATING SYSTEM(S): Systems running PostgreSQL JDBC versions prior to
                                        42.3.3.

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https://www.postgresql.org/about/news/postgresql-jdbc-4233-released-2410/
https://github.com/pgjdbc/pgjdbc/security/advisories/GHSA-673j-qm5f-xpv8
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PostgreSQL JDBC 42.3.3 Released
Posted on 2022-02-17 by JDBC Project


A security advisory has been created for the PostgreSQL JDBC Driver.
The URL connection string loggerFile property could be mis-used to
create an arbitrary file on the system that the driver is loaded.
Additionally anything in the connection string will be logged and
subsequently written into that file. In an insecure system it would
be possible to execute this file through a webserver.

While we do not consider this a security issue with the driver, we have
decided to remove the loggerFile and loggerLevel connection properties
in the next release of the driver. Removal of those properties does
not make exposing the JDBC URL or connection properties to an attacker
safe and we continue to suggest that applications do not allow
untrusted users to specify arbitrary connection properties.

We are removing them to prevent misuse and their functionality can be
delegated to java.util.logging. The changelog is not very useful as the
change was done behind a security advisory. The short version is that
loggerFile and loggerLevel properties still exist but do not do anything.

The PostgreSQL JDBC team would like to thank all that have participated
in this release!


The JDBC Team
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Arbitrary File Write Vulnerability
Moderate	davecramer published GHSA-673j-qm5f-xpv8
Package             org.postgresql (java)
Affected versions   42.3.x, 42.1.x
Patched versions    42.3.3


Description

Overview
The connection properties for configuring a pgjdbc connection are not
meant to be exposed to an unauthenticated attacker. While allowing an
attacker to specify arbitrary connection properties could lead to a
compromise of a system, that's a defect of an application that allows
unauthenticated attackers that level of control.

It's not the job of the pgjdbc driver to decide whether a given log
file location is acceptable. End user applications that use the pgjdbc
driver must ensure that filenames are valid and restrict unauthenticated
attackers from being able to supply arbitrary values. That's not specific
to the pgjdbc driver either, it would be true for any library that can
write to the application's local file system.

While we do not consider this a security issue with the driver, we have
decided to remove the loggerFile and loggerLevel connection properties
in the next release of the driver. Removal of those properties does not
make exposing the JDBC URL or connection properties to an attacker safe
and we continue to suggest that applications do not allow untrusted users
to specify arbitrary connection properties. We are removing them to
prevent misuse and their functionality can be delegated to
java.util.logging.

If you identify an application that allows remote users to specify a
complete JDBC URL or properties without validating it's contents, we
encourage you to notify the application owner as that may be a security
defect in that specific application.

Impact
It is possible to specify an arbitrary filename in the loggerFileName
connection parameter
"jdbc:postgresql://localhost:5432/test?user=test&password=test&loggerLevel=DEBUG&loggerFile=./blah.jsp&<%Runtime.getRuntime().exec(request.getParameter("i"));%>"

This creates a valid JSP file which could lead to a Remote Code Execution


Patches
Problem has not been patched


Workarounds
sanitize the inputs to the driver


Reported by Allan Lou v3ged0ge@gmail.com


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