===================================================================== CERT-Renater Note d'Information No. 2021/VULN509 _____________________________________________________________________ DATE : 05/10/2021 HARDWARE PLATFORM(S): / OPERATING SYSTEM(S): Systems running TYPO3 CMS versions prior to 11.5.0. ===================================================================== https://typo3.org/security/advisory/typo3-core-sa-2021-015 https://typo3.org/security/advisory/typo3-core-sa-2021-014 _____________________________________________________________________ Tue. 5th October, 2021 TYPO3-CORE-SA-2021-015: HTTP Host Header Injection in Request Handling Categories: Development, Security Created by Oliver Hader It has been discovered that TYPO3 CMS is vulnerable to HTTP header injection. Component Type: TYPO3 CMS Subcomponent: Request Handling (ext:core) Release Date: October 5, 2021 Vulnerability Type: HTTP Header Injection Affected Versions: 11.0.0-11.4.0 Severity: Low Suggested CVSS: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N/E:F/RL:O/RC:C References: CVE-2021-41114, CWE-20, CWE-644 Problem Description It has been discovered that TYPO3 CMS is susceptible to host spoofing due to improper validation of the HTTP Host header. TYPO3 uses the HTTP Host header, for example, to generate absolute URLs during the frontend rendering process. Since the host header itself is provided by the client, it can be forged to any value, even in a name-based virtual hosts environment. This vulnerability is the same as described in TYPO3-CORE-SA-2014-001 (CVE-2014-3941). A regression, introduced during TYPO3 v11 development, led to this situation. The already existing setting $GLOBALS['TYPO3_CONF_VARS']['SYS']['trustedHostsPattern'] (used as an effective mitigation strategy in previous TYPO3 versions) was not evaluated anymore, and reintroduced the vulnerability. Solution Update your instance to TYPO3 version 11.5.0 which addresses the problem described. Credits Thanks to TYPO3 framework merger Benjamin Franzke who reported and fixed the issue. General Advice Follow the recommendations that are given in the TYPO3 Security Guide. Please subscribe to the typo3-announce mailing list. General Note All security related code changes are tagged so that you can easily look them up in our review system. _________________________________________________________________________ Tue. 5th October, 2021 TYPO3-CORE-SA-2021-014: Cross-Site-Request-Forgery in Backend URI Handling Categories: Development, Security Created by Oliver Hader It has been discovered that TYPO3 CMS is vulnerable to cross-site-request-forgery. Component Type: TYPO3 CMS Subcomponent: Backend URI Handling (ext:backend) Release Date: October 5, 2021 Vulnerability Type: Cross-Site-Request-Forgery Affected Versions: 11.2.0-11.4.0 Severity: High Suggested CVSS: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:O/RC:C References: CVE-2021-41113, CWE-352 Problem Description It has been discovered that the new TYPO3 v11 feature that allows users to create and share deep links in the backend user interface is vulnerable to cross-site-request-forgery. The impact is the same as described in TYPO3-CORE-SA-2020-006 (CVE-2020-11069). However, it is not limited to the same site context and does not require the attacker to be authenticated. In a worst case scenario, the attacker could create a new admin user account to compromise the system. To successfully carry out an attack, an attacker must trick his victim to access a compromised system. The victim must have an active session in the TYPO3 backend at that time. The following Same-Site cookie settings in $GLOBALS[TYPO3_CONF_VARS][BE][cookieSameSite] are required for an attack to be successful: SameSite=strict: malicious evil.example.org invoking TYPO3 application at www.example.org SameSite=lax or none: malicious evil.com invoking TYPO3 application at example.org Solution Update your instance to TYPO3 version 11.5.0 which addresses the problem described. Credits Thanks to Richie Lee who reported this issue and to TYPO3 core & security team members Benni Mack and Oliver Hader who fixed the issue. General Advice Follow the recommendations that are given in the TYPO3 Security Guide. Please subscribe to the typo3-announce mailing list. General Note All security related code changes are tagged so that you can easily look them up in our review system. ========================================================= + CERT-RENATER | tel : 01-53-94-20-44 + + 23/25 Rue Daviel | fax : 01-53-94-20-41 + + 75013 Paris | email:cert@support.renater.fr + =========================================================