
====================================================================

                             CERT-Renater

                 Note d'Information No. 2021/VULN287
_____________________________________________________________________

DATE                : 27/05/2021

HARDWARE PLATFORM(S): /

OPERATING SYSTEM(S): Systems running curl, libcurl versions prior to
                                          7.77.0.

=====================================================================
https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2021-22898.html
https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2021-22901.html
https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2021-22897.html
_____________________________________________________________________

TELNET stack contents disclosure
================================

Project curl Security Advisory, May 26th 2021 -
[Permalink](https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2021-22898.html)

VULNERABILITY
-------------

curl supports the `-t` command line option, known as
`CURLOPT_TELNETOPTIONS` in libcurl. This rarely used option is used to
send variable=content pairs to TELNET servers.

Due to flaw in the option parser for sending `NEW_ENV` variables,
libcurl could be made to pass on uninitialized data from a stack based
buffer to the server. Therefore potentially revealing sensitive internal
information to the server using a clear-text network protocol.

This could happen because curl did not check the return code from a
`sscanf(command, "%127[^,],%127s")` function invoke correctly, and would
leave the piece of the send buffer uninitialized for the value part if
it was provided longer than 127 bytes. The buffer used for this is 2048
bytes big and the *variable* part of the *variable=content* pairs would
be stored correctly in the send buffer, making curl sending
"interleaved" bytes sequences of stack contents. A single curl TELNET
handshake could then be made to send off a total of around 1800 bytes of
(non-contiguous) stack contents in this style:

    [control byte]name[control byte]
    stack contents
    [control byte]name[control byte]
    stack contents
    ...

An easy proof of concept command line looks like this:

    curl telnet://example.com -tNEW_ENV=a,bbbbbb (256 'b's)

We are not aware of any exploit of this flaw.

INFO
----

This flaw has existed in curl since commit
[a1d6ad2610](https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/a1d6ad2610) in libcurl
7.7, released on March 22, 2001.

The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the
name CVE-2021-22898 to this issue.

CWE-457: Use of Uninitialized Variable

Severity: Medium

AFFECTED VERSIONS
-----------------

- Affected versions: curl 7.7 to and including 7.76.1
- Not affected versions: curl < 7.7 and curl >= 7.77.0

Also note that libcurl is used by many applications, and not always
advertised as such.

THE SOLUTION
------------

Use sscanf() properly and only use properly filled-in buffers.

A [fix for
CVE-2021-22898](https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/39ce47f219b09c380b81f89fe54ac586c8db6bde)

RECOMMENDATIONS
--------------

 A - Upgrade curl to version 7.77.0

 B - Apply the patch to your local version

 C - Avoid using `CURLOPT_TELNETOPTIONS`

TIMELINE
--------

This issue was reported to the curl project on April 27, 2021.

This advisory was posted on May 26, 2021.

CREDITS
-------

This issue was reported and patched by Harry Sintonen.

Thanks a lot!



 / daniel.haxx.se
 | Commercial curl support up to 24x7 is available!
 | Private help, bug fixes, support, ports, new features
 | https://www.wolfssl.com/contact/

_____________________________________________________________________

TLS session caching disaster
============================

Project curl Security Advisory, May 26th 2021 -
[Permalink](https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2021-22901.html)

VULNERABILITY
-------------

libcurl can be tricked into using already freed memory when a new TLS
session is negotiated or a client certificate is requested on an
existing connection.
For example, this can happen when a TLS server requests a client
certificate on a connection that was established without one. A
malicious server can use this in rare unfortunate circumstances to
potentially reach remote code execution in the client.

OpenSSL can declare a "new session" for different reasons, including the
initial TLS handshake completion, TLS 1.2 (or earlier) renegotiation, or
TLS 1.3 client certificate requests. When libcurl at run-time sets up
support for session ID caching on a connection using OpenSSL, it stores
pointers to the transfer in-memory object for later retrieval when
OpenSSL considers a new session to be established.

However, if the connection is used by multiple transfers (like with a
reused HTTP/1.1 connection or multiplexed HTTP/2 connection) that first
transfer object might be freed before the new session is established on
that connection and then the function will access a memory buffer that
might be freed. When using that memory, libcurl might even call a
function pointer in the object, making it possible for a remote code
execution if the server could somehow manage to get crafted memory
content into the correct place in memory.

We are not aware of any exploit of this flaw.

INFO
----

The flaw can only happen in libcurl built to use OpenSSL (or one of its
forks).

This flaw has existed in curl since commit
[a304051620b92](https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/a304051620b92) in
libcurl 7.75.0, released on February 3, 2021.

The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the
name CVE-2021-22901 to this issue.

CWE-416: Use After Free

Severity: High

## Steps to remote code execution

1. libcurl built to use OpenSSL (BoringSSL and libressl work the same)

2. A multi interface using application

3. One of the following:

 - create and use a first easy handle to do HTTP/1.1 over TLS to a
malicious server

 - free that easy handle with `curl_easy_cleanup()`

 - create and use a second easy handle to do HTTP/1.1 over TLS with to
the same server such that the TLS connection is reused

    or

 - more than one concurrent easy handle created that do HTTP/2 over a
TLS connection to a malicious server,

 - the *first* easy handle to use the connection must be freed with
   `curl_easy_cleanup()`

 - at least one easy handle remaining in use of the same connection

4. The attacking server needs to figure out heap address details in
order to know what payload contents to provide

5. The necessary exact memory address in the heap gets populated by
memory contents controlled by the server

6. The attacker starts a new handshake (on TLS 1.2 or earlier), or sends
a TLS 1.3 client certificate request, or otherwise triggers OpenSSL to
consider a new session to be established

For a remote code execution, the client needs to perform (potentially
many) more transfers (and thus have more easy handles) to allow the
server to place crafted contents into heap memory.  Instead of remote
code execution, the client could instead crash or otherwise experience
undefined behaviour.

AFFECTED VERSIONS
-----------------

- Affected versions: curl 7.75.0 to and including 7.76.1
- Not affected versions: curl < 7.75.0 and curl >= 7.77.0

Also note that libcurl is used by many applications, and not always
advertised as such.

THE SOLUTION
------------

When the transfer is detached from the connection, it clears the
association to it from the session ID cache logic.

A [fix for
CVE-2021-22901](https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/7f4a9a9b2a49547eae24d2e19bc5c346e9026479)

RECOMMENDATIONS
--------------

 A - Upgrade curl to version 7.77.0

 B - Apply the patch to your local version

 C - Build libcurl to use another TLS backend

TIMELINE
--------

This issue was reported to the curl project on April 29, 2021.

This advisory was posted on May 26, 2021.

CREDITS
-------

This issue was reported by Harry Sintonen. Patched by Harry Sintonen and
Daniel Stenberg. Help and research by Brad Spencer.

Thanks a lot!

--

 / daniel.haxx.se
 | Commercial curl support up to 24x7 is available!
 | Private help, bug fixes, support, ports, new features
 | https://www.wolfssl.com/contact/

_____________________________________________________________________


schannel cipher selection surprise

Project curl Security Advisory, May 26th 2021

VULNERABILITY

libcurl lets applictions specify which specific TLS ciphers to use in
transfers, using the option called CURLOPT_SSL_CIPHER_LIST. The cipher
selection is used for the TLS negotation when a transfer is done
involving any of the TLS based transfer protocols libcurl supports, such
as HTTPS, FTPS, IMAPS, POP3S, SMTPS etc.

Due to a mistake in the code, the selected cipher set was stored in a
single "static" variable in the library, which has the surprising
side-effect that if an application sets up multiple concurrent
transfers, the last one that sets the ciphers will accidentally control
the set used by all transfers. In a worst-case scenario, this weakens
transport security significantly.

We are not aware of any exploit of this flaw.


INFO

This flaw has existed in libcurl since commit 9aefbff30d280c60fc in
libcurl 7.61.0, released on July 11, 2018.

It can only trigger when Schannel is used, which is the native TLS
library in Microsoft Windows.

The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the
name CVE-2021-22897 to this issue.

CWE-488: Exposure of Data Element to Wrong Session

Severity: Low


AFFECTED VERSIONS

This issue only exists when libcurl is built to use Schannel.

    Affected versions: libcurl 7.61.0 to and including 7.76.1
    Not affected versions: libcurl < 7.61.0 and libcurl >= 7.77.0

Also note that libcurl is used by many applications, and not always
advertised as such.


THE SOLUTION

Store the cipher selection in data associated with the connection.

A fix for CVE-2021-22897


RECOMMENDATIONS

If you're using an Schannel based libcurl, We suggest you take one of
the following actions immediately, in order of preference:

A - Upgrade libcurl to version 7.77.0

B - Apply the patch to your local version

C - Avoid using CURLOPT_SSL_CIPHER_LIST

TIMELINE

This issue was reported to the curl project on April 23, 2021.

This advisory was posted on May 26, 2021.


CREDITS

This issue was reported by Harry Sintonen. Patch by Daniel Stenberg.

Thanks a lot!

=========================================================
+ CERT-RENATER       |    tel : 01-53-94-20-44          +
+ 23/25 Rue Daviel   |    fax : 01-53-94-20-41          +
+ 75013 Paris        |    email:cert@support.renater.fr +
=========================================================



