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                                   CERT-Renater

                        Note d'Information No. 2005/VULN707
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DATE                      : 15/11/2005

HARDWARE PLATFORM(S)      : /

OPERATING SYSTEM(S)       : Systems running ISAKMP implementations.

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CERT-FI and NISCC Joint Vulnerability Advisory ISAKMP

Multiple Vulnerability Issues in Implementation of ISAKMP Protocol

Version Information
- -------------------
Advisory Reference	CERT-FI:  7710
                         NISCC:    273756/NISCC/ISAKMP
Release Date		14 November 2005
Last Revision		14 November 2005
Version Number		1.0
	
Acknowledgement
- ---------------
This issue was identified by the Oulu University Secure Programming Group (OUSPG)
from the University of Oulu in Finland.

What is Affected?
- -----------------
The vulnerabilities described in this advisory affect the Internet Security
Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP), which is used to provide
associations for other security protocols.

Internet Key Exchange version 1 (IKEv1), a derivate of ISAKMP, is an important part
of IPsec. IPsec is widely used to secure exchange of packets at the IP layer and
mostly used to implement Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). In addition to dedicated
VPN-products, ISAKMP/IKE support has also been included in many operating system
distribution packages and some firewall products.

Impact
- ------
The severity of these vulnerabilities varies by vendor, please see the "Vendor
Information" section below for further information or contact your vendor for
product specific information. These flaws may expose Denial-of-Service conditions,
format string vulnerabilities, and buffer overflows. In some cases, it may be
possible for an attacker to execute code.

ISAKMP/IKE client applications may be harder to attack than server applications
because in some cases, it may be required that clients initialise the negotiation.

Summary
- -------
During 2002 OUSPG discovered a number of implementation specific vulnerabilities in
the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP). Further work has been done to
identify implementation specific vulnerabilities in related protocols that are used
in critical infrastructure. The ISAKMP protocol, an important part of the IPsec
protocol which is widely used in critical infrastructure, was studied as part of
this program of work.

OUSPG has developed a PROTOS ISAKMP Test Suite for IKEv1 Phase 1 and employed it to
validate their findings against a number of products from different vendors. CERT-FI
and NISCC has contacted multiple vendors whose products employ ISAKMP/IKE and
provided them with the test tool to allow them to test their implementations. These
vendors' product line covers most of the existing IPsec based VPN-products in the
market.

[Please note that revisions to this advisory will not be notified by email. All
  subscribers are advised to regularly check the NISCC website
  (http://www.niscc.gov.uk/niscc/vulnAdv-en.html) for updates to this notice.]

Details
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The ISAKMP protocol is an international standard protocol, published by the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF). ISAKMP is designed to establish, negotiate, modify
and delete Security Associations (SA). SAs contain all the information required for
execution of various network security services. ISAKMP provides a consistent framework
for transferring key and authentication data which is independent of the key
generation technique, encryption algorithm and authentication mechanism. IKEv1, a
derivate of ISAKMP, is a key protocol in the Internet Security Architecture (IPsec).
IKEv1 is the most widely used version of the Internet Key Exchange protocol.

Please note that the OUSPG PROTOS ISAKMP Test Suite does not test Internet Key
Exchange version 2 (IKEv2).

ISAKMP consists of two phases. In phase 1, the two parties negotiate a SA to agree
on how to protect the traffic in the next phase. In phase 2 keying material is
derived and the policy to share it is negotiated. In this way, security associations
for other security protocols are established.

Multiple ISAKMP implementations behave in anomalous way when they receive and handle
ISAKMP Phase 1 packets with invalid and/or abnormal contents. By applying the OUSPG
PROTOS ISAKMP Test Suite to a variety of products, several vulnerabilities can be
revealed that can have varying effects.

Mitigation
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The following suggestions are recommended as methods to mitigate against the issues
discussed in this advisory:

   -  If possible, use packet filters and accept ISAKMP negotiations only from trusted
      IP-addresses
   -  Avoid using "aggressive mode*" in phase 1

[*In "aggressive mode", fewer exchanges are made and with fewer packets during the
  negotiation stage. The weakness of using this mode is that both sides have exchanged
information before there is a secure channel.]

Solution
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Please refer to the 'Vendor Information' section of this advisory for platform
specific remediation.

Vendor Information
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A complete list of vendor responses to this vulnerability are not currently
available. Please visit the web site at http://www.niscc.gov.uk/niscc/vulnAdv-en.html
in order to view the latest vendor statements.

Credits
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CERT-FI and the NISCC Vulnerability Team would like to thank OUSPG for informing
us of the problems and making the test suite available to vendors.

CERT-FI and the NISCC Vulnerability Team would also like to thank the vendors
for their co-operation in handling this vulnerability and to JPCERT/CC for
co-ordinating this issue in Japan.

Contact Information
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CERT-FI Vulnerability Coordination can be contacted as follows:

Email	   vulncoord@ficora.fi
            Please quote the advisory reference in the subject line

Telephone  +358-9-6966510
            Monday - Friday 08:00 - 16:15 (EET-DST: UTC+3, EET: UTC+2)

Fax	   +358-9-6966515

Post       Vulnerability Coordination
            FICORA/CERT-FI
            P.O. Box 313
            FI-00181 Helsinki
            FINLAND	

CERT-FI encourages those who wish to communicate via email to make use of our
PGP key. This is available from http://www.ficora.fi/suomi/tietoturva/VULNCOORD.asc


The NISCC Vulnerability Management Team can be contacted as follows:

Email	   vulteam@niscc.gov.uk
            Please quote the advisory reference in the subject line

Telephone  +44 (0)870 487 0748 Ext 4511
            Monday - Friday 08:30 - 17:00

Fax	   +44 (0)870 487 0749

Post	   Vulnerability Management Team
            NISCC
            PO Box 832
            London
            SW1P 1BG
	   United Kingdom

We encourage those who wish to communicate via email to make use of our PGP
key. This is available from http://www.niscc.gov.uk/niscc/publicKey2-en.pop.

Please note that UK government protectively marked material should not be sent
to the email address above.

What are CERT-FI and NISCC?
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For further information regarding the Finnish national CERT team, CERT-FI, please
visit http://www.ficora.fi/englanti/tietoturva/cert.htm.

For further information regarding the UK National Infrastructure Security
Co-ordination Centre, please visit http://www.niscc.gov.uk.

Reference to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name,
trademark manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement,
recommendation, or favouring by NISCC. The views and opinions of authors expressed
within this notice shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement
purposes.

Neither shall NISCC accept responsibility for any errors or omissions contained
within this advisory. In particular, they shall not be liable for any loss or
damage whatsoever, arising from or in connection with the usage of information
contained within this notice.


(C) 2005 Crown Copyright

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