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                                  CERT-Renater

                       Note d'Information No. 2005/VULN054
_____________________________________________________________________

DATE                      : 25/01/2005

HARDWARE PLATFORM(S)      : /

OPERATING SYSTEM(S)       : Systems running realplayer 8.

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______________________________________________________________________________

                         SUSE Security Announcement

         Package:                realplayer 8
         Announcement-ID:        SUSE-SA:2005:004
         Date:                   Monday, Jan 24th 2005 16:00 MET
         Affected products:      8.1, 8.2, 9.0, 9.1
                                 SUSE Linux Desktop 1.0
         Vulnerability Type:     remote code execution
         Severity (1-10):        8
         SUSE default package:   yes
         Cross References:       none

     Content of this advisory:
         1) security vulnerability discussed:
                - integer overflow
            problem description
         2) solution/workaround
         3) standard appendix (further information)

______________________________________________________________________________

1) problem description, brief discussion


    RealPlayer is a combined audio and video player for RealMedia formatted
    streaming data. These formats are very common throughout the Internet.

    eEye Security in October 2004 discovered a flaw in the .rm RealMovie
    stream handling routines which allows a remote attacker to exploit an
    integer overflow vulnerability using a special .rm file. This might
    allow a remote attacker to execute code as the user running RealPlayer.

    Reference URLs for this problems are the Real security advisory:
            http://service.real.com/help/faq/security/040928_player/EN/

    and the eEye security advisory:
            http://www.eeye.com/html/research/advisories/AD20041001.html


    SUSE Linux includes RealPlayer as both standalone player and as a
    plugin for web browsers like Mozilla and Konqueror.
    This might allow the attacker to just provide a web page or E-Mail
    linking to the special exploit .rm file.

    We cannot fully evaluate the impact of this problem due to lack of
    information and lack of source code to review.


    SUSE Linux versions up to 9.1 and the SUSE Linux Desktop 1.0
    include RealPlayer version 8 and are affected by this problem.

    SUSE Linux 9.2 and the Novell Linux Desktop 9 include RealPlayer
    version 10 and are NOT affected by this problem.


    Real does not offer a fixed version 8 RealPlayer, but suggests
    upgrading RealPlayer to version 10.

    However, upgrading Realplayer is not possible for older SUSE Linux
    products since Realplayer 10 requires newer dynamic library
    versions than the ones to be found in those products.  Also some old
    Real content is not compatible with the RealPlayer version 10.

    For these reasons we cannot offer fixed packages for older SUSE Linux
    based products.

2) solution/workaround

    We suggest one of the following workarounds:

    a) De-install RealPlayer

       Either use YaST to deinstall RealPlayer, or as root do:

       # rpm -e RealPlayer

       You will lose the ability to view Real content.



    b) Remove the RealPlayer plug in

       As root, execute the following commands:

       # rm /usr/lib/browser-plugins/raclass.zip
       # rm /usr/lib/browser-plugins/rpnp.so


       Content can still be viewed by starting "realplay" and opening
       URLs, but automatic exploits via web pages or E-Mails are no longer
       possible.

______________________________________________________________________________

3)  standard appendix: authenticity verification, additional information

   - Package authenticity verification:

     SUSE update packages are available on many mirror ftp servers all over
     the world. While this service is being considered valuable and important
     to the free and open source software community, many users wish to be
     sure about the origin of the package and its content before installing
     the package. There are two verification methods that can be used
     independently from each other to prove the authenticity of a downloaded
     file or rpm package:
     1) md5sums as provided in the (cryptographically signed) announcement.
     2) using the internal gpg signatures of the rpm package.

     1) execute the command
         md5sum <name-of-the-file.rpm>
        after you downloaded the file from a SUSE ftp server or its mirrors.
        Then, compare the resulting md5sum with the one that is listed in the
        announcement. Since the announcement containing the checksums is
        cryptographically signed (usually using the key security@suse.de),
        the checksums show proof of the authenticity of the package.
        We recommend against subscribing to security lists that cause the
        e-mail message containing the announcement to be modified
        so that the signature does not match after transport through the mailing
        list software.
        Downsides: You must be able to verify the authenticity of the
        announcement in the first place. If RPM packages are being rebuilt
        and a new version of a package is published on the ftp server, all
        md5 sums for the files are useless.

     2) rpm package signatures provide an easy way to verify the authenticity
        of an rpm package. Use the command
         rpm -v --checksig <file.rpm>
        to verify the signature of the package, where <file.rpm> is the
        file name of the rpm package that you have downloaded. Of course,
        package authenticity verification can only target an uninstalled rpm
        package file.
        Prerequisites:
         a) gpg is installed
         b) The package is signed using a certain key. The public part of this
            key must be installed by the gpg program in the directory
            ~/.gnupg/ under the user's home directory who performs the
            signature verification (usually root). You can import the key
            that is used by SUSE in rpm packages for SUSE Linux by saving
            this announcement to a file ("announcement.txt") and
            running the command (do "su -" to be root):
             gpg --batch; gpg < announcement.txt | gpg --import
            SUSE Linux distributions version 7.1 and thereafter install the
            key "build@suse.de" upon installation or upgrade, provided that
            the package gpg is installed. The file containing the public key
            is placed at the top-level directory of the first CD (pubring.gpg)
            and at ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/pubring.gpg-build.suse.de .


   - SUSE runs two security mailing lists to which any interested party may
     subscribe:

     suse-security@suse.com
         -   general/linux/SUSE security discussion.
             All SUSE security announcements are sent to this list.
             To subscribe, send an email to
                 <suse-security-subscribe@suse.com>.

     suse-security-announce@suse.com
         -   SUSE's announce-only mailing list.
             Only SUSE's security announcements are sent to this list.
             To subscribe, send an email to
                 <suse-security-announce-subscribe@suse.com>.

     For general information or the frequently asked questions (FAQ)
     send mail to:
         <suse-security-info@suse.com> or
         <suse-security-faq@suse.com> respectively.

     =====================================================================
     SUSE's security contact is <security@suse.com> or <security@suse.de>.
     The <security@suse.de> public key is listed below.
     =====================================================================
______________________________________________________________________________

     The information in this advisory may be distributed or reproduced,
     provided that the advisory is not modified in any way. In particular,
     it is desired that the clear-text signature shows proof of the
     authenticity of the text.
     SUSE Linux AG makes no warranties of any kind whatsoever with respect
     to the information contained in this security advisory.

Type Bits/KeyID    Date       User ID
pub  2048R/3D25D3D9 1999-03-06 SuSE Security Team <security@suse.de>
pub  1024D/9C800ACA 2000-10-19 SuSE Package Signing Key <build@suse.de>

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